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Unlike the gold industry, which largely affected urban 
industrial centres, the platinum industry has shifted 
the geographical focus of post-apartheid mining. The 
vast platinum-rich rock formation of the Bushveld 
Complex primarily spreads beneath rural communal 
land under the political jurisdiction of traditional 
(formerly known as ‘tribal’) authorities.1  In the past 
two decades these densely populated rural areas 
have become the focus for the expansion of the 
platinum industry, particularly in the North West and 
Limpopo provinces. Having previously fallen under 
the ‘independent homelands’ of Bophuthatswana 
and Lebowa respectively, they bear the hallmarks 
of the apartheid order: extreme poverty, massive 
unemployment, poor education and a paucity of 
basic public services. Major operations of the world’s 
largest platinum producers such as Anglo American 
Platinum Limited (Amplats), Impala Platinum Holdings 
Limited (Implats) and Lonmin Plc (Lonmin) compete 
for space with communities in these overcrowded 
areas.2    
The expansion of the mining industry in communal 
areas coincides with post-apartheid attempts to 
redefine residents in these areas, through law, as 
subjects of ‘traditional communities’ (or ‘tribes’) under 
chiefs. Legislation that has been enacted since the 
early 2000s has not only legitimised the mediation of 
mine–community relationships by traditional leaders, 
but has also significantly enhanced the powers 
of chiefs in South Africa. Although the post-1994 
African National Congress (ANC) government at first 
vacillated about defining and codifying the powers 
and status of chiefs, it eventually passed legislation 
that significantly increased the powers of chiefs in 
rural local governance. The Traditional Leadership 
and Governance Framework Act 2003 (Act 41 of 
2003, or the TLGFA)3 is the main piece of legislation 
in this regard. 
The TLGFA re-enacts traditional (tribal) authorities to 
preside over precisely the same geographic areas 
that were defined by the apartheid government.4  
Drawing on research conducted in the Bakgatla-ba-Kgafela traditional authority area in North West Province, 
this article explores how the expansion of platinum mining on communal land is generating resistance to a local 
chief. The point at issue is the chief’s refusal to account for the mining revenues and business transactions that 
his traditional authority manages on the community’s behalf. The article argues that the North West High Court’s 
interpretation of customary law not only leaves the chief’s unaccountability unchecked but also endorses the 
punishment of village activists who call the chief to account. Hence it remains extremely difficult for ordinary 
rural residents to challenge the chief to account for vast mineral revenues that he controls on behalf of their 
communities. Consequently rural anti-corruption activists are losing faith in the justice system.
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Among other things, the Act enables chiefs and their 
traditional councils to be granted power over the 
administration and control of communal land and 
natural resources, economic development, health 
and welfare, and to administer justice.5 As such, 
not only does this Act impose the former colonial 
tribal authority demarcations on rural citizens, it also 
promotes a controversial governance role for chiefs. 
Other controversial laws that, so far, have been 
successfully resisted by rural citizens include the 
Communal Land Rights Act 2004 (Act 11 of 2004)6,7 
and the Traditional Courts Bill.8,9    
Post-apartheid laws regulating mineral rights, 
particularly the Minerals and Petroleum Resources 
Development Act 2002 (Act 28 of 2002, or the 
MPRDA) and its accompanying regulations, also 
drive the inclusion of traditional communities 
in South Africa’s platinum industry. In seeking 
to redress past injustices by transforming 
relationships between the mining companies and 
local communities, this legislation has adopted a 
range of measures, including continued royalty 
payments, black economic empowerment (BEE) 
mine-community partnerships, and social labour 
plans, as requirements for mining companies. The 
state has encouraged communities who previously 
received royalty compensations for loss of land due 
to mining, to convert their royalties into equity shares. 
Consequently, with the state’s support, chiefs, as 
assumed custodians of communal resources, have 
become mediators of mineral-led development and 
mining deals. 
This means that traditional communities’ interactions 
and engagements with mining companies are 
mediated and controlled by local chiefs. As assumed 
custodians of rural land and other tribal properties, 
chiefs enter into mining contracts and receive 
royalties and dividends on behalf of rural residents 
who live in the mineral-rich traditional authority area. 
This traditional-elite mediated model of community 
participation in the mining industry10 has received 
increased media attention,particularly since the 2012 
Marikana massacre.11 ,12 In the face of protracted 
labour unrest in the platinum sector, the dominant 
view propagated by the government, mining 
companies and the chiefs is that tribal-elite mediated 
community control of mineral revenues is crucial for 
congenial relations within the rural-based platinum 
sector. For instance, Kgosi (Chief) Nyalala Pilane of 
the Bakgatla ‘tribe’ has recently argued that, 
[a] local community with strong leadership 
is an [asset] to a mining company, providing 
easy access to labour and lowering costs … 
Companies … can approach these communities 
in a structured way … it’s a win-win situation for 
everyone.13  
Thus chiefs see themselves as legitimate mediators 
and gatekeepers through whom mining capital 
can gain ‘easy access’ to cheap local labour and 
communal land. However, recent research has shown 
that this model has not yet led to tangible benefits 
for community members, instead it has enhanced 
the power of the chiefs and caused a lack of 
transparency, unaccountability, heightened inequality, 
deepened poverty and local tensions.14 
Post-apartheid laws regulating and governing 
traditional leadership and mining reform have been 
criticised for promoting exclusion and corruption by 
using ‘distorted constructs of custom’ to ‘impose 
contested identities’ and ‘undermining [rural 
residents’] capacity to protect their land and … 
mineral rights’.15  
However, is custom really distorted in these post-
apartheid arrangements? Recognised by the 
Constitution,16 customary law in South Africa falls 
into two main categories: the ‘official’ and the ‘living’ 
law. ‘Official’ customary law is a product of the state 
and legal experts,17 while ‘“living” law refers to the 
law actually observed by the people who created 
it’.18 Official customary law is a product of colonial 
formalisation of indigenous peoples’ law, which 
imposed rigid, Western, rule-oriented conceptions of 
law and order. Living law, on the other hand, evolves 
organically out of ever-changing African socio-
cultural ‘processes’ of dispute resolution.19 Thus 
it is through codification that authentic ‘living law’ 
became distorted. This process of ‘formalisation’ of 
custom enhanced the power of chiefs during colonial 
and apartheid periods. For Mamdani, customary 
law became both ‘all embracing’ and divisive. It 
‘embraced’ under the power of chiefs ‘previously 
autonomous social domains [among others] the 
household, age sets, and gender’. Yet, the purpose 
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of customary law, argues Mamdani, ‘was not about 
guaranteeing rights, it was about enforcing custom. 
It was not about limiting the power [of chiefs], but 
about enabling it’.20  
The Constitution of South Africa mandates the courts 
to: 
[A]pply customary law when that law is applicable, 
subject to the Constitution and any legislation that 
specifically deals with customary law.21 
However, this mandate seems difficult to realise 
in the light of post-1994 legislation that reinforces 
the apartheid-style power and authority of chiefs. 
Claassens cautions:
[T]o determine the content of customary law by 
standards of ‘formal’ law is to apply a distorted 
paradigm.22 
This article demonstrates how judgements by the 
North West High Court not only promote these 
distorted versions of custom, but also bolster and 
protect the power of the chiefs. Drawing on research 
conducted in the Bakgatla-ba-Kgafela traditional 
authority area, North West, the article argues that 
the court’s interpretation of customary law not only 
leaves the chief’s unaccountability and power abuse 
unchecked, it also endorses the punishment of village 
activists who call the chief to account. Hence it is 
extremely difficult for ordinary rural residents in the 
platinum belt to challenge the chief and hold him 
to account for the vast mineral revenues under his 
control on behalf of their communities.
The empirical section of this article begins with a 
summary of local resistance against the Bakgatla-ba-
Kgafela chief, who refuses to be held accountable 
to his community about mining revenues. This 
is followed by a discussion of selected court 
judgements, focusing particularly on the interpretation 
of customary law. 
A note on data collection
This article is based on a study that began in 
August 2009, when I spent three months collecting 
ethnographic data in the villages of Moruleng and 
Lesetlheng.23 I returned to the research site again in 
July 2013 and spent two months conducting another 
round of field research, focusing on platinum mining 
and evolving forms of struggles in the villages of 
Lesetlheng, Motlhabe and Sefikile (See Figure 1). 
The study is still in progress and I continue to make 
sporadic follow-up research visits to the study area. 
The ethnographic material presented here is based 
on selected semi-structured key-informant interviews 
with village activists in the selected villages.24 This 
selected ethnographic material is corroborated by 
reference to selected archival documents in the 
South African National Archives in Pretoria.   
The Bakgatla-ba-Kgafela 
traditional authority area 
The Bakgatla-ba-Kgafela are a Setswana-speaking 
traditional authority community under the leadership 
of Kgosi Nyalala Pilane, and they occupy one of the 
largest communal areas in North West. Their 32 
villages (see Figure 1) are spread over a vast area of 
more than 35 farms in the Pilanesberg region, about 
60 km north of the town of Rustenburg, and fall 
under the Moses Kotane Local Municipality (MKLM). 
With approximately 300 000 residents, the Bakgatla-
ba-Kgafela area is the epitome of a prominent tribal 
authority territory with vast mineral resources.25 
Resistance to the chief’s control over 
mining revenues 
The platinum boom, which began in the early 1990s, 
ushered the Bakgatla-ba-Kgafela area to centre 
stage. Over the past two decades, several mining 
operations have developed in Bakgatla-ba-Kgafela 
territory. On behalf of the residents in the area under 
his jurisdiction, Pilane has entered into numerous 
deals and concessions with the mining companies 
and other investors.26 As a result of these deals, the 
Bakgatla-ba-Kgafela community has become a huge 
business empire worth approximately R15 billion.27 
This has elevated the chief’s power and status. 
There is mounting resistance by members of the 
community to Pilane, due to his lack of transparency 
and accountability in corporate dealings, and 
allegations of corruption against him. The contribution 
by Boitumelo Matlala in this issue covers in detail 
these struggles and their different trajectories. The 
investments that the kgosi has entered into through 
contracts with mining companies are legion. He is 
the director of numerous companies in a complex 
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network that bear the Bakgatla-ba-Kgafela name. 
Some village groups contest these mining contracts 
that are signed by the chief. They argue that their 
forefathers bought the mineral-rich farms as private 
properties and that they should never have become 
tribal land.  
In 2006 the regional court at Mogwase convicted 
Pilane and his close associate, Koos Motshegoe, 
on more than 40 counts of fraud and theft.28 The 
fraud charges centred on the allegation that in 1998 
Pilane signed three loan agreements to the value of 
R13 million with the Land and Agricultural Bank of 
South Africa on behalf of the community, but without 
a community mandate. He pledged to repay this 
money through the annual royalties that the tribal 
authority receives from Anglo American Platinum. The 
regional court found that Pilane ‘was not authorised 
to act on behalf of the tribe to enter into a loan 
agreement’.29  Subsequently the court denied the 
kgosi and his co-accused the right to appeal. His 
lawyer filed a petition to the then Judge President 
of the North West High Court, who in 2009 granted 
the chief and his co-accused permission to appeal 
against their criminal convictions.30 
In September 2010 the high court upheld the 
application and acquitted Pilane and his co-accused 
of all criminal charges.31 This ruling surprised and 
devastated the villagers. The blow was even more 
severe for members of the Concerned Bakgatla 
Anti-Corruption Organisation (COBACO). COBACO, 
a village-based grassroots movement, had worked 
hard, with limited resources, to get the chief 
convicted. It had taken it from 1997 to 2006 to finally 
get Pilane to court. One of the active members of 
COBACO explained:         
Source: Mining and Rural Transformation in Southern Africa (MARTISA), Society Work and Development Institute (SWOP), University of the 
Witwatersrand 
Figure 1: map showing the Bakgatla-ba-Kgafela area
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After that [Pilane’s acquittal] we did nothing. We 
were there but we did not communicate, we did 
not hold meetings, things went quiet.32  
Through summaries of selected court judgements, 
the next section demonstrates how the court’s 
interpretation of custom leaves the chief’s 
unaccountability unchecked in the Bakgatla-ba-
Kgafela area. The 1950s judgement is included, not 
to compare judgements during apartheid with post-
apartheid judgements, but to provide an indication 
of how the courts’ interpretation of customary law 
in the Bakgatla-ba-Kgafela community still results in 
punishment of the chief’s opponents. Ironically, this 
situation continues in the post-1994 democratic era.
The law: a chief’s weapon for 
punishing ‘troublemakers’? 
During the rule of Kgosi Tidimane Pilane – Pilane’s 
predecessor – there were sporadic instances of 
resistance against the traditional authority. In one 
instance in 1953, Kgosi Tidimane imposed a levy 
of one ox per person on every adult male member 
of his tribe for the purchase of the farms Middelkuil 
No. 564 and Syferkuil No. 372. The combined price 
for both farms was £14 000.33 Those who could not 
offer oxen were obliged to pay £15 per person. In 
June 1956 a group of village residents, led by Jacob 
Pilane, a village activist and relative of the chief, 
filed a court petition accusing the chief for failing to 
account for the money he collected and ‘wrongfully 
and unlawfully using and appropriating tribal funds 
for [his] personal benefit’.34   
The hearing took place at the Transvaal Supreme 
Court in Pretoria on 28 June 1956. Jacob Pilane 
was listed as the only ‘petitioner’ against Tidimane. 
Judge C Bekker dismissed Jacob’s application on 
16 August 1956. His judgement was primarily based 
on the argument that the chief had no responsibility 
to account ‘to anyone of his individual subjects’ 
concerning the tribal accounts and that Jacob, 
although a member of the tribe, did not have locus 
standi to file a court application against the chief. 
Bekker continued: 
[I]n native law the chief, in circumstances such as 
the present is held accountable only to the tribe 
acting in, or through a lekgotla or tribal meeting 
... the petitioner [Jacob], in his private capacity is 
not, in my view of the matter entitled to the relief he 
claims – reliefs personal to himself and not to the 
tribe.35     
The judge also awarded costs against Jacob. 
This verdict was not the last of his troubles. The 
chief’s loyalists in Moruleng harassed his family for 
challenging the chief and accused him of trying 
to overthrow the chief. Since the judge awarded 
Tidimane the costs in the case, this gave him more 
ammunition with which to punish Jacob. Jacob was 
unable to pay the legal costs, so Tidimane sent a 
group of men to his home to confiscate his cattle 
and agricultural tools by force. When this happened 
Jacob was in Swaziland, where he worked as a chef. 
One of his sons, who witnessed these events, said:  
The year was 1956 and I was doing Sub B when 
they came and took all my father’s possessions. 
They came looking for my father’s cattle. They 
took three cows together with all the ploughing 
equipment and left. They sold them to a white 
farmer called Piet Koos … in Pilanesberg.36  
Jacob never recovered his confiscated property. 
The judgement against Jacob Pilane relied 
significantly on a distorted version of ‘official’ custom, 
which absolved chiefs from accounting to individual 
community members, thus providing them with 
enormous leverage to manipulate the downward 
accountability processes. As the only person entitled 
to call meetings (according to the ‘official custom’), 
if a chief wants to avoid accountability he can simply 
refuse to convene community meetings. 
The courts’ use of distorted ‘official custom’ 
continues in the post-apartheid democratic era. 
Over the past decade, Pilane has filed several court 
interdicts against a number of villagers who have 
challenged his power over the Bakgatla-ba-Kgafela 
community. This has intensified as more and more 
community members display displeasure with the 
chief’s unilateral control over mining revenues.  
In May 2008 Pilane filed an urgent court interdict 
at the North West High Court against a group of 
residents led by David Pheto. Identifying themselves 
as the ‘Royal House’, Pheto and other disgruntled 
community leaders had called an urgent general 
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community meeting (a Kgotha-Kgothe) in order 
to oppose the mining transactions that the chief 
was about to sign on behalf of the community. 
The meeting was to be held on 21 May 2008. The 
dissenting group of residents also wanted to pre-
empt another general meeting called by the chief 
on 28 June 2008 to co-opt the community into 
endorsing a murky mining transaction. Through this 
meeting Pilane intended to obtain a tribal resolution 
for a transaction between Itereleng Bakgatla 
Mineral Resources (Pty) Ltd (IBMR) (owned by the 
Bakgatla-ba-Kgafela) and Barrick Platinum South 
Africa (Pty) Ltd (Barrick), a subsidiary of Barrick Gold 
Corporation.37 The villagers opposed this transaction, 
mainly because they felt marginalised. They felt that 
the chief was unilaterally signing a mining contract 
that undermined their land rights without fully 
involving them.38      
At the time, Pilane was facing a case of numerous 
instances of fraud and theft.39 Pheto and other 
villagers demanded that he step down from his 
position. In response, Pilane interdicted Pheto and 
five other leaders of the dissent ‘from interfering with 
a … general meeting which was to be held on 28 
June 2008’.40  
In the North West High Court, Judge AM Kgoele 
consolidated the two interdicts and handed down the 
judgement, confirming both the interim interdicts by 
the chief against Pheto and others on 3 December 
2008.41 The central argument in the judge’s decision 
was that Pheto and five other community leaders did 
not have locus standi to call meetings of the tribe or 
to mobilise for the removal of Pilane from his position. 
Kgoele dismissed their claim that they were members 
of the ‘Royal House’ and refused them leave to 
appeal. The Supreme Court of Appeal also turned 
down their request for leave to appeal this decision.  
Subsequent judgements at the North West High 
Court have reinforced Kgoele’s decision. This has 
helped to suppress opposition against Pilane. For 
instance, in September 2011 Judge RD Hendricks 
confirmed an interdict by Kgosi Nyalala Pilane 
against Pheto and other leaders, preventing them 
from calling community meetings. In line with 
previous judgements and the North West High Court, 
the judge found that Pheto and others were not 
members of the ‘Royal Family’, therefore they did not 
have locus standi to call meetings or to represent any 
group of villagers in Bakgatla-ba-Kgafela territory. 
Hendricks imposed punitive costs on Pheto and his 
fellow dissenters. He averred:
… it is quite apparent that the [r]espondents are 
doing everything within their means to unseat 
and undermine the authority of the [a]pplicants 
[Kgosi Nyalala and the Traditional Council] and to 
litigate as often as possible in an attempt to create 
confusion within the tribe. This behaviour borders 
on being vexatious. This, to my mind, calls for a 
punitive costs order.42 
In other cases involving local activists against Pilane, 
decisions at the North West High Court were no 
different. The court’s decisions continue to endorse 
the version of custom that ossifies the chief’s power 
over communal property and endorses the tribal 
authority as the only legitimate authority with locus 
standi to represent village residents. For instance, 
in a land dispute case between Pilane and a group 
called Bakgatla-ba-Sefikile Traditional Community 
Association (BBSTCA),43 Judge MM Leeuw, citing the 
Constitution and customary law, argued: 
In this matter I am enjoined by the Constitution 
to recognise that land that is held by the Kgosi or 
traditional leader on behalf of a tribal community 
should be dealt with in terms of legislations that 
have been enacted for the purpose of regulating 
amongst others, the ownership thereof as well as 
the role and powers of the traditional leaders.44
The judge dismissed the application of the BBSTCA 
with costs.  
Also at the North West High Court on 30 June 2011, 
Judge AA Landman’s judgement upheld Pilane’s 
interdicts against Mmuthi Pilane and Reuben Dintwe. 
Mmuthi Pilane and Dintwe are two activists leading 
a secession attempt by the residents of Motlhabe 
village. The judge argued:
Any action by a parallel but unsanctioned structure 
that is neither recognised by law or custom 
seeking to perform or assume functions that 
are clearly the exclusive preserve of recognised 
authorities ought to incur the wrath of law.45     
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The North West High Court and the Supreme Court 
of Appeal denied Mmuthi Pilane and Dintwe leave 
to appeal against this judgement. The lawyers who 
represented the two activists took the matter to 
the Constitutional Court, which set aside the three 
interdicts in February 2013, mainly on the basis that 
these ‘interdicts adversely impact on the applicants’ 
rights to freedom of expression, association and 
assembly’.46 The Constitutional Court judgement 
was a landmark victory for traditional communities: 
it affirmed the freedom of expression, assembly and 
association of rural residents. It should be cautioned, 
however, that the setting aside of the three interdicts 
against Mmuthi Pilane and Dintwe (also mentioned in 
Monica de Souza’s contribution in this edition) did not 
reverse the previous judgements or the cost orders 
issued against Pheto and other village activists.    
Pheto’s punishment and dwindling 
faith in the justice system
As a result of one of several punitive costs orders, 
Pheto has suffered great personal loss, including loss 
of his livelihood. On 18 October 2013 the North West 
High Court issued a ‘Writ of Execution’ of punitive 
costs against Pheto. According to this document 
Pheto owes Pilane R372 204,30 in legal costs. This 
originated from Kgoele’s judgement in December 
2008 when she confirmed two of Kgosi Nyalala’s 
interdicts and imposed punitive costs on Pheto and 
the six other respondents.47 The baffling irony remains 
the fact that, out of seven respondents, the North 
West High Court has targeted Pheto alone with the 
execution of legal costs: the amount is not divided 
among the court respondents. Obviously, Pheto 
perceives himself as being targeted as a leader of the 
‘rebellion’:
Why did the apartheid government kill Steve 
Biko? Why did they arrest Nelson Mandela? It’s 
because these leaders were causing trouble to that 
oppressive regime. The punitive costs are targeting 
the ‘troublemakers’. That is why I am the only 
person who is being punished.48           
Before this incident Pheto was running a legal 
practice in Mogwase, about 10km from Lesetlheng 
village where he lives with his family. The sheriff has 
since attached all his office equipment and Pheto 
has not been able to continue with his legal practice. 
The small butchery that he had been running with his 
siblings in Moruleng was also closed down after the 
sheriff attached all the equipment inside. Pheto and 
his ailing mother have fought to defend the property 
at his home in Lesetlheng from being attached. 
Pilane’s numerous court applications against Pheto 
and other leaders have also contributed towards 
Pheto’s financial demise. As one of the few villagers 
who had some kind of income in the impoverished 
Bakgatla-ba-Kgafela territory, Pheto and other 
leaders had to pay the lawyers who represented 
them out of their personal funds. It is therefore 
unsurprising that some of the community activists 
who were previously with Pheto in these court battles 
against the chief have now abandoned the struggle. 
Some have even shifted allegiances to join forces 
with Pilane, and now occupy senior positions in the 
traditional political hierarchy. These positions are 
allegedly accompanied by good salaries and other 
benefits.   
It is no exaggeration to argue that court cases and 
costs orders have, even if accidentally, functioned 
as a potent tool for chiefs to suppress opposition 
and constrain the rights of rural villagers, especially 
in the face of rural-based platinum mining expansion 
in North West. This instils fear in the villagers and 
prevents them from challenging the power of the 
chief. It is against the backdrop of the North West 
High Court’s judgements that Bakgatla-ba-Kgafela 
activists have experienced a loss of faith in the justice 
system. The evident difficulties in removing the chief’s 
control over the mining revenues have led to some 
nicknaming him ‘Mr Untouchable’.49   
The situation is aggravated by the fact that villagers 
have had to use their meagre financial resources in 
their efforts to obtain justice. With a despairing tone, 
Pheto described the situation:
The chief uses tribal funds to enjoy the luxury of 
hiring the most expensive legal expertise in the 
land to fight against ordinary rural community 
members like us. We act on behalf of the tribe. The 
police arrest us. The courts target us with punitive 
costs so that the chief can hold us in subservience. 
The grand apartheid is not yet over. We don’t have 
money to hire big lawyers and private investigators. 
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We have tried everything we could to defend 
our rights from the chief and the vultures [mining 
companies] from all over the world who converge 
on our forefathers’ land to prey on the poorest of 
the poor. We’ve been fighting for so long without 
any help from the current government. Time is 
moving fast. You grow up every day, then you get 
sick and you die.50  
As pointed out earlier, the leaders of COBACO have 
not only struggled to maintain their support in their 
villages after losing the appeal case against the chief 
at the North West High Court in 2010, but their faith 
in the justice system has also dwindled.
Conclusion 
Using the Bakgatla-ba-Kgafela community as a 
case study, this article has demonstrated a threefold 
paradox. Firstly, it has revealed that vast mineral 
wealth has enhanced the chief’s power. Secondly, 
it has shown that it remains extremely difficult for 
ordinary villagers to hold the chief to account about 
communal resources. This hardship is exacerbated 
by the courts’ application of distorted custom, 
which punishes villagers through costs orders. 
This means that marginalised rural residents are 
afraid of challenging their chiefs, and diffuses 
resistance to unaccountable traditional authorities. 
The chief also uses tribal finances generated 
through platinum mining to suppress resistance and 
intensify his hold over mineral revenues. Thirdly, the 
general lack of faith in the justice system must be 
understood against the backdrop of this process 
of marginalisation and punishment. Although it is 
impossible to generalise from just one case, one can 
still argue that unaccountability is likely to continue 
in the rural platinum belt as long as the interpretation 
of custom applied by the North West High Court 
functions as a tool for unaccountable chiefs to punish 
villagers who challenge them. 
Such a phenomenon reveals a serious deficit in 
the current democratic order: unelected traditional 
leaders champion mineral-led development with very 
limited accountability measures. As shown in this 
article, the court’s interpretation of custom makes 
it even more difficult for villagers to hold the chief to 
account. 
To comment on this article visit 
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